Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making

Arbeitspapier

Governments do not have perfect information regarding the priorities and the needs of different groups in the economy. This lack of knowledge opens the door for different groups to lobby the government in order to receive the government?s support. We set up a model of hierarchical contests and compare the implications of a centralized allocation process with a decentralized allocation process. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of fiscal federalism.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 547

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
• Subject: fiscal federalism ; economic models of political processes ; contests ; rentseeking ; intergovernmental relations ; Finanzföderalismus ; Rent Seeking ; Finanzausgleich ; Vereinigte Staaten

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Epstein, Gil S. ; Gang, Ira N.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21381
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET