Arbeitspapier

Taxation, social protection, and governance decentralization

Governments do not have perfect information regarding constituent priorities and needs. This lack of knowledge opens the door for groups to lobby in order to affect the government’s taxation levels. We examine the political economy of decentralized revenue-raising authority in light of social protection expenditures by constructing a theoretical model of hierarchical contests and comparing the implications of centralized with decentralized governance. Increasing information available to the government may generate additional expenditures by interest groups trying to affect government taxation decisions. We show the potential existence of a poverty trap as a result of decentralization in taxation decisions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 143

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Thema
governance
decentralization
economic-models-of-political-processes
contests
rentseeking
intergovernmental-relations

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Epstein, Gil S.
Gang, Ira N.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
(wo)
Maastricht
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Epstein, Gil S.
  • Gang, Ira N.
  • Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Entstanden

  • 2017

Ähnliche Objekte (12)