Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited

Arbeitspapier

We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2018:21

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Market Design ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Characterization ; House-allocation ; Strategy-proofness ; Multiobject auction

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Andersson, Tommy ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (where): Lund
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260250
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET