Arbeitspapier

Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

to connected objects

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We then establish that on any minimally rich domain, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 699

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
Secure implementation
Dominant strategy implementation
Nash implementation
Indivisible goods
Strategy-proofness
Neue politische Ökonomie
Öffentliche Güter
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fujinaka, Yuji
Wakayama, Takuma
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(where)
Osaka
(when)
2007

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fujinaka, Yuji
  • Wakayama, Takuma
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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