Arbeitspapier
Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We then establish that on any minimally rich domain, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.
- Language
 - 
                Englisch
 
- Bibliographic citation
 - 
                Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 699
 
- Classification
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                Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
 
- Subject
 - 
                Secure implementation
Dominant strategy implementation
Nash implementation
Indivisible goods
Strategy-proofness
Neue politische Ökonomie
Öffentliche Güter
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie
 
- Event
 - 
                Geistige Schöpfung
 
- (who)
 - 
                Fujinaka, Yuji
Wakayama, Takuma
 
- Event
 - 
                Veröffentlichung
 
- (who)
 - 
                Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
 
- (where)
 - 
                Osaka
 
- (when)
 - 
                2007
 
- Handle
 
- Last update
 - 
                
                    
                        10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
 
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
 
Associated
- Fujinaka, Yuji
 - Wakayama, Takuma
 - Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
 
Time of origin
- 2007