Arbeitspapier
Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal richness. We then establish that on any minimally rich domain, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 699
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
Secure implementation
Dominant strategy implementation
Nash implementation
Indivisible goods
Strategy-proofness
Neue politische Ökonomie
Öffentliche Güter
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fujinaka, Yuji
Wakayama, Takuma
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fujinaka, Yuji
- Wakayama, Takuma
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2007
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