Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages

Arbeitspapier

A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and like the Clark-Groves mechanisms in general not "budget balanced". The efficiency loss due to fairness and strategy-proofness becomes measurable in monetary terms. Two interpretations of the formal model is discussed. First, it is a situation where a given sum of money has to be distributed as wages and fair wages are to be implemented. Second, it is as an auction model where a number of objects are simultaneously traded.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2004:8

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Computable General Equilibrium Models ; Cooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Subject: ndivisibilities ; fairness ; strategy-proofness ; wages ; Vickrey-auction

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (where): Lund
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/259881
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET