Arbeitspapier
Strategy-Proof Package Assignment
We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Peyton Young, 1987, Mathematics of Operations Research 12 (3), 397-414.), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 2013:43
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Market Design
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- Thema
-
Package assignment
Indivisible objects
Strategy-proofness
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Erlanson, Albin
Szwagrzak, Karol
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Lund
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Erlanson, Albin
- Szwagrzak, Karol
- Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2013
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