Strategy-Proof Package Assignment

Arbeitspapier

We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism obtained by maximizing a separably concave function over a polyhedral extension of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations is strategy-proof. Moreover, these are the only strategy-proof and unanimous mechanisms satisfying a coherence property and responding well to changes in the availability of resources. These mechanisms generalize the parametric rationing mechanisms (Peyton Young, 1987, Mathematics of Operations Research 12 (3), 397-414.), some of which date back to the Babylonian Talmud.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2013:43

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Market Design ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
• Subject: Package assignment ; Indivisible objects ; Strategy-proofness

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Erlanson, Albin ; Szwagrzak, Karol
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (where): Lund
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260099
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET