Arbeitspapier
On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex ante. However, we show that there is no mechanism that is likewise (i) strategy-proof and (ii) boundedly invariant, and that Paretodominates Random Serial Dictatorship. Moreover, the same holds for all mechanisms that are ex-post efficient, strategy-proof, and boundedly invariant: no such mechanism is dominated by any other mechanism that is likewise strategy-proof and boundedly invariant.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2023-202
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- Thema
-
random assignment
strategy-proofness
ex-post efficiency
bounded invariance
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Basteck, Christian
Ehlers, Lars H.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Basteck, Christian
- Ehlers, Lars H.
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2023
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