A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auction

Arbeitspapier

We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting experiments for the pay-your-bid auction, which is not strategy-proof, with and without advice, we find that our experimental results are not attributed to so-called experimenter demand effects. Strategy-proof mechanisms are sometimes criticized because players often fail to find the benefit of truth-telling, but our observations tell that introducing an educative announcement helps them behave "correctly".

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1048

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: advice effect ; strategy-proofness ; Vickrey auction ; pay-your-bid auction ; market design

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Masuda, Takehito ; Sakai, Toyataka ; Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Wakayama, Takuma
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/230455
• Last update: 01.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET