Arbeitspapier
On the timing of climate agreements
A central issue in climate policy is the question whether long-term targets for green- house gas emissions should be adopted. This paper analyzes strategic effects related to the timing of such commitments. Using a two-country model, we identify a redistributive effect that undermines long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric and side payments are unavailable. The effect enables countries to shift rents strategically via their R&D efforts under delayed cooperation. In contrast, a complementarity effect stabi- lizes long-term cooperation, because early commitments in abatement induce countries to invest more in low-carbon technologies, and create additional knowledge spillovers. Con- trasting both effects, we endogenize the timing of climate agreements.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2014-044
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Externalities
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
- Thema
-
climate treaty
abatement
long-term cooperation
spillover
strategic delay
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schmidt, Robert C.
Strausz, Roland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schmidt, Robert C.
- Strausz, Roland
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
Entstanden
- 2014
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