Arbeitspapier
Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation
We analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto-improving to all parties.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 45.2005
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Public Goods
Environmental Economics: General
- Thema
-
International environmental agreements
Timing of participation decision
Coalition theory
Role of international regulator
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Finus, Michael
Rundshagen, Bianca
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Finus, Michael
- Rundshagen, Bianca
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2005
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