- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Identifier
-
1206794291
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- DOI
-
10.18452/4531
- URN
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
26.01.2023, 13:54 MEZ
Objekttyp
- Monografie
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