Arbeitspapier

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 50.2005

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Subject
Self-enforcing international environmental agreements
Climate policy
Transfers
Umweltabkommen
Klimaschutz
Internationaler Transfer
Welt

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Carraro, Carlo
Eyckmans, Johan
Finus, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Carraro, Carlo
  • Eyckmans, Johan
  • Finus, Michael
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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