Arbeitspapier
Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements
The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making welfare optimal agreements self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 50.2005
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
- Thema
-
Self-enforcing international environmental agreements
Climate policy
Transfers
Umweltabkommen
Klimaschutz
Internationaler Transfer
Welt
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Carraro, Carlo
Eyckmans, Johan
Finus, Michael
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Carraro, Carlo
- Eyckmans, Johan
- Finus, Michael
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2005