Arbeitspapier
Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements
An increasingly popular instrument for solving environmental problems is the "public voluntary agreement (VA)", in which government offers modest technical assistance and positive publicity to firms that reach certain environmental goals. Prior papers treat such agreements as a superior, low-cost instrument that can be used to pre-empt a threat of traditional, inefficient, regulation. We present a more general model in which public Vas may instead be weak tools used when political opposition makes environmental taxes infeasible. We explore the conditions under which taxes, public VAs, and unilateral industry actions are to be expected, the implications for industry size, as well as the welfare implications of the various instruments.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 80. 2000
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Economics of Regulation
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
- Thema
-
Self-regulation
public voluntary agreements
environmental regulation
Selbstverpflichtung
Ökosteuer
Vergleich
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lyon, Thomas P.
Maxwell, John W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lyon, Thomas P.
- Maxwell, John W.
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2000