Arbeitspapier

Self-regulation, taxation and public voluntary environmental agreements

An increasingly popular instrument for solving environmental problems is the "public voluntary agreement (VA)", in which government offers modest technical assistance and positive publicity to firms that reach certain environmental goals. Prior papers treat such agreements as a superior, low-cost instrument that can be used to pre-empt a threat of traditional, inefficient, regulation. We present a more general model in which public Vas may instead be weak tools used when political opposition makes environmental taxes infeasible. We explore the conditions under which taxes, public VAs, and unilateral industry actions are to be expected, the implications for industry size, as well as the welfare implications of the various instruments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 80. 2000

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Economics of Regulation
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Thema
Self-regulation
public voluntary agreements
environmental regulation
Selbstverpflichtung
Ökosteuer
Vergleich
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lyon, Thomas P.
Maxwell, John W.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lyon, Thomas P.
  • Maxwell, John W.
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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