Arbeitspapier
The impact of voluntary environmental agreements on firms' incentives for technology adoption
The paper reconsiders the Porter hypothesis in an offer/counter-offer bargaining model, in which a welfare-maximising regulator and an industry representative negotiate over which regulatory instrument to apply with which stringency. The possibility to contest planned regulation in the political arena is given as an outside option of the bargaining model. Policy instruments differ in their impacts on firms' profits and market shares, which yields different incentives for technology adoption. Furthermore, means of direct regulation may lead to an implicit cartelisation of the industry. This latter feature shapes the actors' equilibrium threat position, which, in turn, influences incentives to contest the regulation and the subsequent regulatory outcome. Depending on the parties' respective position in the political contest, the implementation of voluntary agreements or of other (negotiated or mandatory) policy instruments, as well as their impact on the technology adoption incentives, is endogenously derived within this single model.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 110. 2000
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
Voluntary agreements
technology adoption
Porter Hypothesis
Selbstverpflichtung
Umweltmanagement
Technologiewahl
Anreizregulierung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lehmann, Markus A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lehmann, Markus A.
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2000
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Voluntary agreements with industries: Participation incentives with industry-wide targets
Participation incentives and the design of voluntary agreements: Special issue on voluntary approaches, competition and competitiveness
Voluntary agreements with industry
Voluntary agreements and competition law
Environmental regulation through voluntary agreements
Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats
A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements
Self-enforcing voluntary agreements and environmental reputation
Voluntary Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Guest workers: Adequate incentives for voluntary return
Non-Verifiable Emissions, Voluntary Agreements, and Emission Taxes
Voluntary agreements in environmental policy: Negotiating emission reductions
Voluntary agreements with industries: Participation incentives with industry-wide targets
Participation incentives and the design of voluntary agreements: Special issue on voluntary approaches, competition and competitiveness
Voluntary agreements with industry
Voluntary agreements and competition law
Environmental regulation through voluntary agreements
Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats
A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements
Self-enforcing voluntary agreements and environmental reputation
Voluntary Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Guest workers: Adequate incentives for voluntary return
Non-Verifiable Emissions, Voluntary Agreements, and Emission Taxes
Voluntary agreements in environmental policy: Negotiating emission reductions
Voluntary agreements with industries: Participation incentives with industry-wide targets
Participation incentives and the design of voluntary agreements: Special issue on voluntary approaches, competition and competitiveness
Voluntary agreements with industry
Voluntary agreements and competition law
Environmental regulation through voluntary agreements
Voluntary Agreements under Endogenous Legislative Threats
A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements
Self-enforcing voluntary agreements and environmental reputation
Voluntary Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
Guest workers: Adequate incentives for voluntary return
Non-Verifiable Emissions, Voluntary Agreements, and Emission Taxes