Arbeitspapier
A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements
We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various oligopoly parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a "toughest firm principle" holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 81. 2000
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Umweltstandard
Selbstverpflichtung
Verhandlungstheorie
Oligopol
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Manzini, Paola
Mariotti, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Manzini, Paola
- Mariotti, Marco
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2000
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