Pareto-efficient climate agreements

Arbeitspapier

Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a "narrow but deep" treaty with a "broad but shallow" treaty.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 505

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
• Thema: Climate ; non-cooperative game-theory ; repeated games ; weakly renegotiation-proof agreements

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Asheim, Geir B. ; Holtsmark, Bjart
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Statistics Norway, Research Department
• (wo): Oslo
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/192487
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ