Climate agreements and technology policy

Arbeitspapier

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers within and across countries, and the technology externalities within each country are corrected through a domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the properties of international climate agreements when the inter-country externalities from R&D are not regulated through the climate agreement. With an international agreement controlling abatements directly through emission quotas, the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower that the socially optimal subsidy.The equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate agreement does not specify emission levels directly, but instead imposes a common carbon tax.Social costs are higher under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement.Moreover, for a reasonable assumption on the abatement cost function, R&D investments and abatement levels are lower under a tax agreement than under a quota agreement. Total emissions may be higher or lower in a second-best optimal quota agreement than in the first-best optimum.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Memorandum ; No. 2004,11

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: General ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy ; Energy: Government Policy
• Thema: Climate policy ; international environmental agreements ; R&D Policy ; technology spillovers ; Klimaschutz ; Umweltabkommen ; Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik ; Spillover-Effekt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Golombek, Rolf ; Hoel, Michael
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (wo): Oslo
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63044
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 2025-03-10T11:41:46+0100