Arbeitspapier

Climate policy under technology spillovers

We study climate policy when there are technological spillovers between countries, and there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments. All countries are better off in the tax case than in the quota case. Two types of international climate agreements are then studied: One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries. None of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the Kyoto case. It is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher R&D expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2003,22

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
Renewable Resources and Conservation: General
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Energy: Government Policy
Thema
Climate policy
international environmental agreements
R&D
technology spillovers
Klimaschutz
Umweltabkommen
Forschung
Spillover-Effekt
Emissionsrechte
Ökosteuer
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Golombek, Rolf
Hoel, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Golombek, Rolf
  • Hoel, Michael
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2003

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