Arbeitspapier

Cross-Border Political Donations and Pareto-Efficient Tariffs

This paper examines the effects of lobbying activities across international borders, on determining each country’s import tariff in a multi-principal, multi-agent, menu-auction model. Cross-border political donations could promote international policy cooperation because of two of their distinctive characteristics. First, special interest groups use cross-border donations as tools to wield their influence on ruling parties of other countries directly, which promotes efficiency of policy formation. Second, for ruling parties of countries, cross-border donations make them take into account the impact of their policy on other countries, which makes them more sensitive to other countries’ welfare and, therefore, more cooperative with others. When ruling parties estimate the worth of political contributions from national special interest groups and from foreign lobbying groups with the same weight, Pareto-efficient tariffs are attained at which world welfare is maximized.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Center Discussion Paper ; No. 915

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
Thema
Cross-border Donations
Truthful Equilibrium
Pareto-Efficient Tariffs
Interessenpolitik
Parteienfinanzierung
Zoll
Importbeschränkung
Pareto-Optimum
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Endoh, Masahiro
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Yale University, Economic Growth Center
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Endoh, Masahiro
  • Yale University, Economic Growth Center

Entstanden

  • 2005

Ähnliche Objekte (12)