On the timing of climate agreements

Arbeitspapier

A central issue in climate policy is the question whether long-term targets for green- house gas emissions should be adopted. This paper analyzes strategic effects related to the timing of such commitments. Using a two-country model, we identify a redistributive effect that undermines long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric and side payments are unavailable. The effect enables countries to shift rents strategically via their R&D efforts under delayed cooperation. In contrast, a complementarity effect stabi- lizes long-term cooperation, because early commitments in abatement induce countries to invest more in low-carbon technologies, and create additional knowledge spillovers. Con- trasting both effects, we endogenize the timing of climate agreements.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2014-044

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
• Subject: climate treaty ; abatement ; long-term cooperation ; spillover ; strategic delay

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schmidt, Robert C. ; Strausz, Roland
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103786
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET