Arbeitspapier

The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements

This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement for different sharing rules applied to the gains from co-operation. We use a 12-regions model designed to examine internal and external stability of coalitions (STACO). We compare different sharing rules like, for example, grandfathering (i.e. sharing proportional to emissions) and a number of so-called equitable rules like, for example, sharing proportional to population or according to historical responsibilities. Due to strong free-rider incentives we find only small stable coalitions for all sharing rules examined. As a general pattern we observe that coalitions consist of regions with low marginal abatement costs, which are attractive partners in any coalition, and regions which have the highest claims according to the respective sharing rule. Furthermore, we find that a grandfathering scheme leads to the largest and – in terms of greenhouse gas abatement – most successful coalition, while many of the equitable rules achieve very little.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 99.2004

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
Thema
International environmental agreements
Sharing rules
Stability of coalitions
Umweltabkommen
Emissionshandel
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Koalition
Welt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Weikard, Hans-Peter
Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos
Finus, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Weikard, Hans-Peter
  • Altamirano-Cabrera, Juan-Carlos
  • Finus, Michael
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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