Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we introduce the CLIMNEG World Simulation (CWS) model for simulating cooperative game theoretic aspects of global climate negotiations. The model is derived from the seminal RICE model by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). We first state the necessary conditions that determine optimal investment and emission abatement paths under alternative cooperation regimes, and then we test empirically with a numerical version of the CWS model whether the cooperative game theoretic "core" property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997) holds. Under this transfer scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries, should have an interest in leaving the international environmental agreement. For the numerical specification of the CWS model used here, we obtain the result that this is indeed the case.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 75.2001

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Externalities ; International Policy Coordination and Transmission
• Subject: Environmental economics ; climate change ; burden sharing ; simulations ; core of cooperative games ; Internationale Umweltpolitik ; Umweltabkommen ; Klimaschutz ; Umweltökonomik ; Klimawandel ; Pareto-Optimum ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Eyckmans, Johan ; Tulkens, Henry
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155238
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET