Arbeitspapier
Sharing the Surplus and Proportional Values
We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first assigns to each player a compromise between his stand-alone worth and the average stand-alone worths over all players, and then allocates the remaining worth among the players in proportion to their stand-alone worths. This family contains the proportional division value and the new egalitarian proportional surplus division value as two special cases. We provide characterizations for this family of values, as well as for each single value in this family.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2020-014/II
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
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Cooperative game
proportional value
surplus sharing
axiomatization
balanced contributions
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Zou, Zhengxing
van den Brink, Rene
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2020
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Zou, Zhengxing
- van den Brink, Rene
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2020
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Bankruptcy Codes and Risk Sharing of Currency Unions
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Sharing Information through Delegation and Collaboration
Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
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Compromising between the proportional and equal division values: axiomatization, consistency and implementation
Who Values The Status of The Entrepreneur?
Intergenerational Risk Sharing with Market Liquidity Risk
Bankruptcy Codes and Risk Sharing of Currency Unions
A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects
Loyalty Programs and Consumer Behaviour: The Impact of FFPs on Consumer Surplus
Axiomatizations of Permission Values for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure using Split Neutrality
Optimal Sharing of Labor Productivity Risks and Mix of Pay-As-You-Go and Savings
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