Arbeitspapier
Compromising between the proportional and equal division values: axiomatization, consistency and implementation
We introduce a family of values for TU-games that offers a compromise between the proportional and equal division values. Each value, called an alpha-mollified value, is obtained in two steps. First, a linear function with respect to the worths of all coalitions is defined which associates a real number to every TU-game. Second, the weight assigned by this function is used to weigh proportionality and equality principles in allocating the worth of the grand coalition. We provide an axiomatic characterization of this family, and show that this family contains the affine combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value as the only linear values. Further, we identify the proportional division value and the affine combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value as those members of this family, that satisfy projection consistency. Besides, we provide a procedural implementation of each single value in this family.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2020-054/II
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
Cooperative game
consistency
equal division value
proportional division value
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Zou, Zhengxing
van den Brink, Rene
Funaki, Yukihiko
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Zou, Zhengxing
- van den Brink, Rene
- Funaki, Yukihiko
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2020
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