Arbeitspapier

Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values

One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it possible to study this trade-off in a consistent way by providing three types of results on egalitarian Shapley values being convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. First, we show that all these solutions satisfy the same reduced game consistency. Second, we characterize this class of solutions using monotonicity properties. Finally, we provide a non-cooperative implementation for these solutions which only differ in the probability of breakdown at a certain stage of the game.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 07-062/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Welfare Economics: General
Thema
Shapley value
Equal division solution
Egalitarian Shapley value
Reduced Game Consistency
Monotonicity
Implementation
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
van den Brink, René
Funaki, Yukihiko
Ju, Yuan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:21 MESZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • van den Brink, René
  • Funaki, Yukihiko
  • Ju, Yuan
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2007

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