Arbeitspapier
Equal Loss under Separatorization and Egalitarian Values
We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their affine combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, in Economics Letters 122(2): 167-169, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2020-043/II
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
-
Cooperative game
equal division value
equal surplus division value
axiomatization
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Zou, Zhengxing
van den Brink, Rene
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2020
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Zou, Zhengxing
- van den Brink, Rene
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2020
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