Arbeitspapier
Labor Market Matching under Imperfect Information
Recent research has shown that the standard labor matching model hasdifficulties in reproducing the co-movement patterns observed in US data. Thisis due to the fact that the standard model lacks sufficient propagation of shocks.This paper shows that refining the informational structure of the model leadsto improvements along this dimension: when agents cannot separately identifypersistent and transitory technology shocks on impact (so that they must solvea signal extraction problem), shocks are propagated. Under this specificationthe standard matching model even manages to make recoveries initially jobless,as in the data.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 10-098/2
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Thema
-
imperfect information
labor market matching
signal extraction
jobless growth
Unvollkommene Information
Suchtheorie
Schätzung
USA
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Willems, Tim
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Willems, Tim
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2010
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