Arbeitspapier
Bankruptcy Codes and Risk Sharing of Currency Unions
Since the Eurozone Crisis of 2010-12, a critical debate on the viability of a currency union has focused on the role of a fiscal union in adjusting for country heterogeneity. However, a fully-fledged fiscal union may not be politically feasible. This paper develops a two-country general equilibrium model to examine the benefits of the bankruptcy code of a capital markets union - in the absence of a fiscal union - as an alternative mechanism to improve the financial stability and welfare of a currency union. When domestic credit risks are present, I show that a lenient bankruptcy code in the cross-border capital markets union removes the pecuniary externality of banking insolvency, so it leads to a Pareto improvement within the currency union. Moreover, the absence of floating nominal exchange rates removes a mechanism to neutralise domestic credit risks; I show that softening the bankruptcy code can recoup the lost benefits of floating nominal exchange rates. The model provides the financial stability and welfare implications of bankruptcy within a capital markets union in the Eurozone.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2021-009/IV
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
International Financial Markets
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- Thema
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Equilibrium default
bankruptcy code
fiscal union
capital markets union
financial stability
bank credit and inside money
price-level and exchange rate determinacy
liquidity-intermediary asset pricing
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Wang, Xuan
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
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2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Wang, Xuan
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2021