Designing financial support for SMEs during crises: The role of bank lending

Arbeitspapier

When designing schemes to help SMEs survive crises, the government typically faces asymmetric information, so that it cannot target the SMEs most worth saving. We show that the government can exploit the information in the borrower loan demand to improve policy targets compared with existing programmes. If the aim is employment protection, optimal policy should fully subsidise the funding cost of only those SMEs whose loan size is below a threshold. If the aim is economic efficiency, the government should target SMEs whose loan size is above a threshold. In general, public policy should utilise private sectors' information and expertise.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2021-097/IV

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
• Thema: pandemic crisis ; bank lending ; unemployment ; information asymmetry ; small and medium-sized enterprises

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Wang, Tianxi ; Wang, Xuan
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/248781
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ