Arbeitspapier

Designing financial support for SMEs during crises: The role of bank lending

When designing schemes to help SMEs survive crises, the government typically faces asymmetric information, so that it cannot target the SMEs most worth saving. We show that the government can exploit the information in the borrower loan demand to improve policy targets compared with existing programmes. If the aim is employment protection, optimal policy should fully subsidise the funding cost of only those SMEs whose loan size is below a threshold. If the aim is economic efficiency, the government should target SMEs whose loan size is above a threshold. In general, public policy should utilise private sectors' information and expertise.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2021-097/IV

Classification
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
Subject
pandemic crisis
bank lending
unemployment
information asymmetry
small and medium-sized enterprises

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Wang, Tianxi
Wang, Xuan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2021

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Wang, Tianxi
  • Wang, Xuan
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2021

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