Arbeitspapier
Designing financial support for SMEs during crises: The role of bank lending
When designing schemes to help SMEs survive crises, the government typically faces asymmetric information, so that it cannot target the SMEs most worth saving. We show that the government can exploit the information in the borrower loan demand to improve policy targets compared with existing programmes. If the aim is employment protection, optimal policy should fully subsidise the funding cost of only those SMEs whose loan size is below a threshold. If the aim is economic efficiency, the government should target SMEs whose loan size is above a threshold. In general, public policy should utilise private sectors' information and expertise.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2021-097/IV
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
- Subject
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pandemic crisis
bank lending
unemployment
information asymmetry
small and medium-sized enterprises
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Wang, Tianxi
Wang, Xuan
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2021
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Wang, Tianxi
- Wang, Xuan
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2021