Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility

Arbeitspapier

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss a class of solutions containing all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value, and the egalitarian solution. We characterize this class of solutions using a general standardness for two player games and reduced game consistency. Specific cases of these properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-136/1

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games
• Thema: TU-game ; Equal surplus sharing ; CIS-value ; ENSC-value ; Egalitarian solution ; Reduced Game Consistency ; Kooperatives Spiel ; Transferable Utility Games

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): van den Brink, René ; Funaki, Yukihiko
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/86357
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ