Arbeitspapier
Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss a class of solutions containing all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value, and the egalitarian solution. We characterize this class of solutions using a general standardness for two player games and reduced game consistency. Specific cases of these properties characterize specific solutions in this class.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-136/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
-
TU-game
Equal surplus sharing
CIS-value
ENSC-value
Egalitarian solution
Reduced Game Consistency
Kooperatives Spiel
Transferable Utility Games
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
van den Brink, René
Funaki, Yukihiko
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2004
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- van den Brink, René
- Funaki, Yukihiko
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2004
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