Arbeitspapier

Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships

to connected objects

Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Most partnerships share profits equally among the partners. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992) it is often argued that peer pressure mitigates the arising free-rider problem. This line of reasoning takes the equal sharing rule as exogenously given. The purpose of our paper is to show that with inequity averse partners - a behavioral assumption akin to peer pressure - the equal sharing rule arises endogenously as an optimal solution to the incentive problem in a partnership.

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 217

Classification: Wirtschaft
Production and Organizations: General
Economics of Contract: Theory
Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms; Employee Ownership

Subject: equal sharing rule
partnerships
incentives
peer pressure
inequity aversion

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Bartling, Björn
von Siemens, Ferdinand

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

(where): München

(when): 2007

DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13335

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93984

URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13335-0

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Show original at data provider

Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Bartling, Björn
von Siemens, Ferdinand
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

2007

Other Objects (12)

Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships

Arbeitspapier

Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships

Long-Term Effects of Equal Sharing: Evidence from Inheritance Rules for Land

Arbeitspapier

Long-Term Effects of Equal Sharing: Evidence from Inheritance Rules for Land

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Arbeitspapier

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Partnerships with asymmetric information: The benefit of sharing equally amongst unequals

Arbeitspapier

Partnerships with asymmetric information: The benefit of sharing equally amongst unequals

Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

Arbeitspapier

Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

Equal sacrifice and fair burden sharing in a public goods economy

Arbeitspapier

Equal sacrifice and fair burden sharing in a public goods economy

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Arbeitspapier

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Arbeitspapier

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models

Arbeitspapier

Sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models

Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach

Arbeitspapier

Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach

Uniform, equal division, and other envy-free rules between the two

Arbeitspapier

Uniform, equal division, and other envy-free rules between the two

The relationship between altruism and equal sharing. Evidence from inter vivos transfer behavior

Arbeitspapier

The relationship between altruism and equal sharing. Evidence from inter vivos transfer behavior

Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships

Arbeitspapier

Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships

Long-Term Effects of Equal Sharing: Evidence from Inheritance Rules for Land

Arbeitspapier

Long-Term Effects of Equal Sharing: Evidence from Inheritance Rules for Land

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Arbeitspapier

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Partnerships with asymmetric information: The benefit of sharing equally amongst unequals

Arbeitspapier

Partnerships with asymmetric information: The benefit of sharing equally amongst unequals

Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

Arbeitspapier

Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

Equal sacrifice and fair burden sharing in a public goods economy

Arbeitspapier

Equal sacrifice and fair burden sharing in a public goods economy

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Arbeitspapier

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Arbeitspapier

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models

Arbeitspapier

Sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models

Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach

Arbeitspapier

Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach

Uniform, equal division, and other envy-free rules between the two

Arbeitspapier

Uniform, equal division, and other envy-free rules between the two

The relationship between altruism and equal sharing. Evidence from inter vivos transfer behavior

Arbeitspapier

The relationship between altruism and equal sharing. Evidence from inter vivos transfer behavior

Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships

Arbeitspapier

Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships

Long-Term Effects of Equal Sharing: Evidence from Inheritance Rules for Land

Arbeitspapier

Long-Term Effects of Equal Sharing: Evidence from Inheritance Rules for Land

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Arbeitspapier

Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

Partnerships with asymmetric information: The benefit of sharing equally amongst unequals

Arbeitspapier

Partnerships with asymmetric information: The benefit of sharing equally amongst unequals

Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

Arbeitspapier

Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

Equal sacrifice and fair burden sharing in a public goods economy

Arbeitspapier

Equal sacrifice and fair burden sharing in a public goods economy

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Arbeitspapier

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Arbeitspapier

Estate division: Equal sharing as choice, social norm, and legal requirement

Sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models

Arbeitspapier

Sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models

Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach

Arbeitspapier

Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach

Uniform, equal division, and other envy-free rules between the two

Arbeitspapier

Uniform, equal division, and other envy-free rules between the two

The relationship between altruism and equal sharing. Evidence from inter vivos transfer behavior

Arbeitspapier

The relationship between altruism and equal sharing. Evidence from inter vivos transfer behavior

Cultural heritage institutions wishing to register will find more information here.

Fields marked * need to be filled in.

Username*

Please enter your username

Email*

Please enter your email address

Please do not fill this field

First name

Last name

Password*

Please enter your password

Confirm password*

Please enter the same password

I have read the terms of use and the privacy policy for the collection of personal data and accept them. *

This field is required.

I would like to subscribe to the newsletter of the Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek. See newsletter subscription info.

Account created

Your "My DDB" account has been successfully created. Before you can log in to your account, you must click the confirmation link in the message we just sent to the email address you provided.