Uniform, equal division, and other envy-free rules between the two

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the problem of fairly allocating an amount of a divisible resource when preferences are single-peaked. We characterize the class of envy-free and peak-only rules and show that the class forms a complete lattice with respect to a dominance relation. We also pin down the subclass of strategy-proof rules and show that the subclass also forms a complete lattice. In both cases, the upper bound is the uniform rule, the lower bound is the equal division rule, and any other rule is between the two.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 723

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
• Thema: Uniform rule ; Choice of rules ; Lattice ; Pareto dominance ; Singlepeaked preference ; Fair allocation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Sakai, Toyotaka ; Wakayama, Takuma
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (wo): Osaka
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92876
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 2025-03-10T11:41:58+0100