Least Manipulable Envy-free Rules in Economies with Indivisibilities

Arbeitspapier

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In "small" economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules which are least manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find an envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012:8

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Thema: (Least) Manipulability ; Envy-freeness ; Budget-Balance ; Indivisibilities.

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Andersson, Tommy ; Ehlers, Lars ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
• (wo): Lund
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260035
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ