Uniform, equal division, and other envy-free rules between the two

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the problem of fairly allocating an amount of a divisible resource when preferences are single-peaked. We characterize the class of envy-free and peak-only rules and show that the class forms a complete lattice with respect to a dominance relation. We also pin down the subclass of strategy-proof rules and show that the subclass also forms a complete lattice. In both cases, the upper bound is the uniform rule, the lower bound is the equal division rule, and any other rule is between the two.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 723

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
• Subject: Uniform rule ; Choice of rules ; Lattice ; Pareto dominance ; Singlepeaked preference ; Fair allocation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Sakai, Toyotaka ; Wakayama, Takuma
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92876
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET