Arbeitspapier
Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-prize auction and fair division game.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,014
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Noncooperative Games
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Subject
-
Auctions
Fair Division
Procedural fairness
Envy-Freeness
Auktionstheorie
Verteilungsgerechtigkeit
Neid
Gerechtigkeit
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Güth, Werner
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (where)
-
Jena
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2010
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