Arbeitspapier
Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity (an outside seller versus collective ownership) and the price rule (fist versus second price). Our results indicate more equilibrium behavior under the procedurally fair price rule, what, however, does not completely crowd out equality and efficiency seeking.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,073
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Thema
-
auctions
fair division games
procedural fairness
Auktionstheorie
Gerechtigkeit
Soziale Beziehungen
Crowding out
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, M. Vittoria
- Ploner, Matteo
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2010
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