Arbeitspapier
Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design varies ownership of the single indivisible commodity (an outside seller versus collective ownership) and the price rule (fist versus second price). Our results indicate more equilibrium behavior under the procedurally fair price rule, what, however, does not completely crowd out equality and efficiency seeking.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,073
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Auctions
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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auctions
fair division games
procedural fairness
Auktionstheorie
Gerechtigkeit
Soziale Beziehungen
Crowding out
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Güth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (where)
-
Jena
- (when)
-
2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Levati, M. Vittoria
- Ploner, Matteo
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2010
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Preisregeln für Auktionen und Ausschreibungen
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Rules (of bidding) to generate equal stated profits: An axiomatic approach
Do banks crowd in or out business ethics? An indirect evolutionary analysis
Perfect or Bounded Rationality? : Some Facts, Speculations and Proposals
Purely Procedural Preferences - Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity
Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions: An experimental study
Beyond procedural equity and reciprocity
Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: A theoretical and experimental analysis
Specific institutional aspects of international cooperation: A game theoretic account
Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism
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