Arbeitspapier
Purely Procedural Preferences - Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SITE Working Paper ; No. 3
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Thema
-
procedural preferences
experiment
institutional design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Chlaß, Nadine
Güth, Werner
Miettinen, Topi
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Chlaß, Nadine
- Güth, Werner
- Miettinen, Topi
- Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)
Entstanden
- 2016
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