Arbeitspapier
Fairness that money can buy: Procedural egalitarianism in practice
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers; No. 2013-003
Bezug (was)
Wirtschaft
National Budget; Budget Systems
Externalities
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
fair procedures
egalitarian mechanisms
unanimity
constitutional political economy
non-state communities
governing the commons
crowding out
National Budget; Budget Systems
Externalities
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
fair procedures
egalitarian mechanisms
unanimity
constitutional political economy
non-state communities
governing the commons
crowding out
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
Güth, Werner
Kliemt, Hartmut
Jena: Univ. u.a.
Kliemt, Hartmut
Jena: Univ. u.a.
Erschienen
Jena: Univ. u.a.
- Rechteinformation
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
18.10.2021, 08:57 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Kliemt, Hartmut
- Jena: Univ. u.a.
Entstanden
- Jena: Univ. u.a.
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