Arbeitspapier
Collectively ranking candidates: An axiomatic approach
Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates since they care more or less for the various qualities of the candidates. It is assumed that all evaluators submit vector bids assigning a monetary bid for each possible rank order. The rules must specify for all possible vectors of such vector bids the collectively binding rank order of candidates and the payments for this bid vector and its implied rank order. Three axioms uniquely define the procedurally fair ranking rules. We finally discuss how our approach can be adjusted to situations where one wants to rank only acceptable candidates.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2011,020
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Noncooperative Games
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
social ranking
fairness
fair game forms
objective equality
mechanism
design
committee decision making
Personalauswahl
Gruppenentscheidung
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Gerechtigkeit
Mechanism Design
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2011
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