Arbeitspapier
Endogenous community formation and collective provision: A procedurally fair mechanism
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers; No. 2013-013
Bezug (was)
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Value Theory
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Externalities
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Collective action
equality axiom
mechanism design
procedural fairness
public provision
Auctions
Value Theory
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Externalities
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Collective action
equality axiom
mechanism design
procedural fairness
public provision
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
Güth, Werner
Jena: Max Planck Institute of Economics
Jena: Max Planck Institute of Economics
Erschienen
Jena: Max Planck Institute of Economics
- Rechteinformation
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
18.10.2021, 08:58 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Jena: Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- Jena: Max Planck Institute of Economics
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