Arbeitspapier
Whom to blame? An experiment of collective harming and punishing
In a situation, where it is efficient for one of two parties to pollute but highly inefficient if both parties do so, the harmed third party can freely impose its damage claims on both parties what crucially determines which equilibrium to expect. Whereas 'equality before the law' requires equal punishments, efficient equilibria are predicted when holding one party responsible and letting the other escape punishment. After discussing equilibrium selection for the game, we report on an experiment with two treatment variables: one that determines when the harmed party announces its potential damage claims and one varying a game- and justice-unrelated difference between the two culprits. According to our experimental data, 'equality before the law' dominates but is weakened by asymmetry in wealth and the possibility to announce sanctions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2011,046
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Law and Economics: General
- Thema
-
law and economics
equality vs. efficiency
equilibrium selection
laboratory experiments
Umwelthaftung
Rechtsdurchsetzung
Grundrecht
Wirtschaftliche Effizienz
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Gleichgewicht
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Otsubo, Hironori
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Otsubo, Hironori
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2011
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