Arbeitspapier
Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment
We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture. However, we observe a significant amount of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, when compared with decentralized bargaining, has no significant effect on the payoffs of the players in the joint venture but reduces the payoff of the third player.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1999,90
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
Bargaining
Joint Venture
Merger
Experiments
Equilibrium Selection
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Berninghaus, Siegfried
Güth, Werner
Keser, Claudia
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
1999
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10046770
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Berninghaus, Siegfried
- Güth, Werner
- Keser, Claudia
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Time of origin
- 1999
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