Arbeitspapier
Effects of profitable downsizing on collective bargaining
We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the available pie, and in case he doesnt exclude him despite strong monetary incentives. We find that on the aggregate level the proposers decision has no effect on acceptance thresholds. However, if the proposer excludes one responder, the distribution of thresholds becomes bimodal, indicating a polarization in behavior.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2008,011
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
- Thema
-
bargaining
experiment
labor markets
Personalabbau
Rentabilität
Lohnverhandlungen
Verhandlungstheorie
Gerechtigkeit
Emotion
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fischer, Sven
Güth, Werner
Köhler, Christoph
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fischer, Sven
- Güth, Werner
- Köhler, Christoph
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2008
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