Arbeitspapier
Studying deception without deceiving participants: An experiment of deception experiments
Banning deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters who can gain by deceiving those in the role of participants. We compare treatments with and without possible deception by experimenter-participants to test whether deception aects behaviour of participant-participants in a dictator experiment and whether participants in the role of experimenters engage in deception. We find no dierence in behaviour of participant-participants between the treatments whereas most participants in the role of experimenters engage in deception.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,024
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
Design of Experiments: General
- Subject
-
Experimental economic methods
Deception
Experiments
Experimentelle Ökonomik
Betrug
Test
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Alberti, Federica
Güth, Werner
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (where)
-
Jena
- (when)
-
2012
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Alberti, Federica
- Güth, Werner
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Time of origin
- 2012
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