Arbeitspapier

Will you accept without knowing what? A Thuringian newspaper experiment of the Yes-No Game

Many economic experiments are run in the laboratory with students as participants. In this paper we use a newspaper experiment to learn more about external validity of lab research. Our workhorse is the Yes-No game. Unlike in ultimatum games responders of the Yes-No games do not know the proposal when deciding between whether to accept it or not. We use two different amounts that can be shared (100€ and 1000€). In line with findings for the ultimatum game, offers were fairer and rejections less likely when participants are older and submit their decisisons via mail rather than the Internet. By comparing our results with other studies (using executives or students), we demonstrate, at least for this type of game, the external validity of lab research.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,006

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Field Experiments
Thema
Verhandlungstheorie
Test
Zeitung
Internet

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Güth, Werner
Kirchkamp, Oliver
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Güth, Werner
  • Kirchkamp, Oliver
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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